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ONLINE SHOPPING: BUY ONE, LOSE LEGAL RIGHTS FOR 
FREE 
Laura Cicirelli* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet allows consumers to purchase goods from the 
comfort of their homes without setting foot inside a traditional brick-
and-mortar store.1  While online consumers enjoy the conveniences of 
online shopping, problems can arise involving the relatively new legal 
sphere of online contracting.  Although consumers obtain goods or 
electronic information (e.g., music downloads or digital applications) 
via online purchases, they also lose certain legal rights by entering into 
retailers’ online agreements.2  State contract law governs online 
contracting3 and requires an online consumer’s assent to an online 
retailer’s agreement terms.4  Online retailers have the burden of proof 
to show that the consumer had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
terms—a difficult standard to meet.5 
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 1  See Shelly Banjo & Drew Fitzgerald, Stores Confront New World of Reduced Shopper 
Traffic, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304419104579325100372435802.  
 2  See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55 (discussing the potential loss of one’s right to trial 
by jury through arbitration agreements).  
 3  See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]ssues of contract . . . are nearly always governed by state law.”).  
 4  Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789–90 (N.D. Ill. 
2011).   
 5  There is a difference between constructive knowledge and constructive notice.  
In cases lacking actual knowledge, courts consider the various circumstances of a given 
case to find constructive notice.  Courts have used a finding of constructive notice of 
a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and conditions to justify a finding of constructive 
knowledge in these online contracting cases.  To find a particular online agreement 
enforceable, assent by the parties must be determined by actual knowledge, or more 
commonly, the finding of such constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms and 
conditions.  See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) 
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The United States Constitution,6 as well as many state 
constitutions,7 preserves the right to a civil jury trial unless properly 
waived.  As court dockets have become increasingly populated, 
mandatory arbitration provisions have helped ease docket caseloads.8  
The United States Supreme Court has persistently upheld the 
enforceability of such provisions through its broad interpretation of 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).9  As a result, many online retailers 
now include arbitration provisions in their online agreements because 
of the benefits they provide to online retailers.10  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s strong stance regarding the enforceability of such provisions,11 
courts will not enforce them without the consumer’s actual or 
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms.12  This requirement 
has led many courts to consider the presence of actual or constructive 
knowledge in online contracting cases, especially in the online 
retailing context.13 
This Comment will demonstrate how most online consumers have 
neither actual nor constructive knowledge of online browse-wrap 
agreements’ terms.  By adopting the reasoning in Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp.,14 the leading case addressing browse-wrap 
 
(“But where, as here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge 
of the agreement, the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the 
website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the 
contract.”); Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 790–91 (“[A]bsent a showing of actual 
knowledge of the terms by the webpage user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on 
whether the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.”). 
 6  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 7  See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9.  
 8  See generally Mary Dunnewold, Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Every Law 
Student Should Know, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 2009, at 14.  
 9  Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 116 (1925).   
 10  See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2.  
 11  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding that 
FAA trumps even state laws aimed at protecting consumers from unconscionable class 
action waivers); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (finding that FAA 
trumps conflicting state laws); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like 
defense to arbitrability.”). 
 12  See, e.g., Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 79091 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[A]bsent a showing of actual knowledge of the terms by the webpage 
user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on whether the website provided reasonable 
notice of the terms of the contract.”).  
 13  See generally, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 
893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012). 
 14  306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).  
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agreements, and evaluating empirical and psychological data of online 
consumers’ tendencies,15 courts can create bright-line rules 
articulating when, in the absence of actual knowledge, constructive 
knowledge of an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement exists.16  This 
Comment suggests rules that state legislatures and/or states’ highest 
courts can adopt to create uniformity regarding online retailers’ 
browse-wrap agreements. 
This Comment focuses on browse-wrap agreements between 
online retailers and consumers.  Although its analysis reaches other 
provisions within such agreements, it has special resonance for 
arbitration provisions in particular; the increasing use of such 
provisions and their negative effects on the naïve online consumer 
make this a pertinent Comment topic.  Part II discusses the world of 
online contracting and its different forms.  Part III provides a 
background of arbitration and its increasing relevance due to the FAA.  
Part IV of the Comment introduces Specht and its rationale for finding 
particular browse-wrap agreements unenforceable.  Part V introduces 
psychological and eye-tracking studies of online consumers.  The 
studies presented in Part V help support the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Specht.  Based on the Specht court’s decision and the studies 
presented in Part V, Part VI recommends rules of law for online 
retailers to follow to assure consumers have constructive knowledge of 
a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and conditions.  Part VII concludes. 
II. ONLINE CONTRACTING 
Arbitration provisions not only appear in written contracts but, 
now, in online contracts as well.  To fully understand such a transition, 
one must understand the different forms of online contracting.  This 
part of the Comment will briefly introduce the two main forms of 
online contracting: click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts.  Although 
this Comment focuses on browse-wrap contracts, it explains click-wrap 
contracts for comparative purposes. 
A. Click-Wrap and Browse-Wrap Contracts 
Click-wrap contracts and browse-wrap contracts differ in the way 
a contracting party accepts contractual terms.  Click-wrap agreements 
 
 15  See McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15 (Fla. 1998) (noting the 
“establishment of the scientific respectability of psychology and its use and effect on 
the law”).   
 16  Without these bright-line rules of law, the individual opinions of various judges 
would determine users’ constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, resulting 
in varied and inconsistent results. 
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require an online consumer to scroll through the document 
containing the agreement and affirmatively indicate acceptance of its 
terms in some way, usually by clicking an “I Agree” box.17  Conversely, 
browse-wrap agreements require no such affirmative conduct by the 
online consumer to show acknowledgement of its terms and 
conditions.  Instead, a consumer’s use of the retailer’s website and/or 
subsequent purchases from the website are claimed to constitute 
acceptance of the agreement’s terms.18  The terms of the browse-wrap 
agreement, frequently available through hyperlinks labeled “Terms of 
Use” or “Terms and Conditions,”19 often appear at the bottom of the 
retailer’s webpage.20 
B. Assent Under Both Types of Online Contracts 
Both click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts often contain 
arbitration provisions that online consumers enter into unknowingly.  
In the eyes of the courts, the principles of contract law still apply to 
online contracts.21  Under contract law, a valid contract requires a 
finding of mutual assent between the parties to enter into such a 
contract.22  State contract law controls the inquiry into proper assent.23  
Courts assume assent to the terms of a given online agreement when 
they find the online user had proper notice to the agreement’s terms.24  
 
 17  See Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and 
Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 9596 (2008). 
 18  See E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill. 
2012) (“Browsewrap agreements typically ‘involve a situation where notice on a website 
conditions use of the site upon compliance with certain terms or conditions, which 
may be included on the same page as the notice or accessible via a hyperlink.’” 
(quoting Southwest Airlines v. BoardFirst L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 
4823761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007))).   
 19  See, e.g., DELL, infra note 73; EBAY, infra note 73. 
 20  Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d, 
380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]ebsite terms and conditions of use are posted on 
the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”).   
 21  See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (“The making of contracts over the internet ‘has not fundamentally changed 
the principles of contract.’” (quoting Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d 
Cir. 2004))). 
 22 See id. (noting the necessity of mutual assent for contracts on the Internet); see 
also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“[T]he FAA does not 
require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so . . . .”).  
 23  See, e.g., Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (citing Carey v. Richards Bldg. Supply 
Co., 856 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)). 
 24  See Dan Streeter, Into Contract’s Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap 
Licenses, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1363, 1388 (2002) (suggesting that if ample evidence 
exists to find a potential licensee’s action to constitute assent, then any contract 
formed by such assent should be enforced).  
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The party wishing to enforce the arbitration agreement, or any other 
provisions housed within a given online contract, must show proper 
notice by either the online consumer’s: (1) actual knowledge of the 
terms and conditions; or (2) constructive knowledge of the terms.25  By 
requiring either actual or constructive knowledge of an online 
agreement’s terms, courts seek to ensure that only those disputes that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate are actually arbitrated.26 
Courts have been more willing to uniformly enforce arbitration 
provisions contained in click-wrap agreements as opposed to those 
contained in browse-wrap agreements.27  This outcome evolved from 
the reasoning that an online consumer’s affirmative act of clicking to 
enter into the click-wrap agreement demonstrates actual knowledge by 
the consumer of the agreement’s terms.28  With notice demonstrated 
by these affirmative acts, courts need not enter into the muddied 
waters of determining what exactly constitutes constructive notice.  For 
browse-wrap agreements, however, finding assent to an agreement’s 
terms becomes more difficult.29  Although the assent analysis is the 
same for the two different types of online contracts, in that both 
require actual or constructive knowledge, its application for browse-
wrap agreements turns on the idea of constructive knowledge.30 
 
 25  See Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 79091. 
 26  See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) 
(“Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent, and thus is a way to resolve those disputes—
but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 90–
91 (noting that “[c]ontracts that exist in computerized format are not necessarily 
unenforceable” unless there is a lack of assent).  
 27  See Siedle v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 114344 
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (finding a click-wrap agreement enforceable and valid); i.Lan Sys., 
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 33839 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(recognizing the enforceability of a click-wrap agreement since the website’s user, 
downloading software, “clicked on the box stating ‘I agree’”); William J. Condon, Jr., 
Note, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap 
Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 446 (2003/2004) (stating that “many federal 
and state courts enforce clickwrap agreements”).  
 28  Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 96 (“It makes perfect sense that the frequency 
of cases enforcing click-wrap agreements should generally be higher, as assent is more 
clearly expressed by clicking on words or buttons indicating agreement.”).  
 29  See Streeter, supra note 24, at 1365 (“The key feature of browse-wrap, and the 
source of its legal uncertainty, is that it does not force a potential licensee to undertake 
an act that explicitly expresses an intent to enter into the license, such as clicking ‘I 
agree.’”).   
 30  See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“But 
where, as here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the 
agreement, the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website 
puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”); Be In, 
Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12–CV–03373–LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
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In analyzing an online consumer’s assent to a browse-wrap 
agreement, courts first look for actual knowledge of the agreement’s 
terms.  Proving actual knowledge of such terms and conditions is 
nearly impossible for browse-wrap agreements because this would 
require the online consumer, usually the party arguing the 
unenforceability of such a contract, to admit to seeing the terms and 
conditions on the retailer’s website; very few online consumers would 
admit to doing so when the consumer would prefer his day in court 
over the decision of an arbitrator.  Also, since hyperlinks at the very 
bottom of retail webpages often house these agreements, very few 
online consumers will likely have actual knowledge of these terms. 
Although courts uniformly fail to find actual knowledge in 
browse-wrap cases, the decisions pertaining to constructive knowledge 
are not as uniform.31  With this lack of uniformity regarding 
constructive knowledge analysis, the enforceability of online retailers’ 
browse-wrap agreements depends on different judges’ individual 
determinations.  Since the crux of the assent analysis for browse-wrap 
agreements turns on a finding of constructive knowledge rather than 
actual knowledge, courts need some guidance from their state 
 
9, 2013) (“[C]ourts will refuse to enforce browsewrap arbitration provisions where 
there is a failure to allege ‘facts tending to show that a user would have had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the Terms and Conditions.’” (quoting Hines v. Overstock, 
Inc., 380 F. App’x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2010))); E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 
F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (“Because no affirmative action is required by the 
website user to agree to the terms of a contract other than his or her use of the website, 
the determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends on whether the 
user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms and conditions.”); Van 
Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 79091 (“Thus, absent a showing of actual knowledge of the 
terms by the webpage user, the validity of a browsewrap contract hinges on whether 
the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.”). 
 31  Compare E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (finding that Facebook’s 
Terms of Service (TOS) reasonably put plaintiffs on notice because the TOS “are 
hyperlinked on every page accessed by a facebook.com user in underlined, blue text 
that contrasts with the white background of the hyperlink”) (applying California law), 
Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542 CAS (JCx), 2008 WL 4772125, at *7 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[T]here is no indication from case law that defendants will 
be unable as a matter of law to show that plaintiff had notice of the Terms of Use on 
their website.  Indeed, courts have held that a party’s use of a website may be sufficient 
to give rise to an inference of assent to the Terms of Use contained therein (so called 
‘browsewrap contracts’).”), Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 
1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Having determined that Plaintiff is highly likely to 
succeed in showing that Defendants viewed and navigated through ticketmaster.com, 
the Court further concludes that Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that 
Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use and assented to them by actually using 
the website.”), and Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“Appellant’s contention that the website terms were so inconspicuous that a 
reasonably prudent internet user could not know or learn of their existence, or assent 
to them without a ‘click,’ is unconvincing.”), with cases discussed infra Part IV.   
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legislature or their state’s highest court to determine what legally 
constitutes constructive knowledge.  Such guidance would create a 
uniform standard and prevent the enforceability of these agreements, 
including their encompassed arbitration provisions, from being at the 
mercy of different judges’ individual discretions. 
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT 
Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution in which two 
opposing parties agree to entrust a neutral third party to determine a 
dispute’s outcome,32 has become increasingly utilized in many 
different contracts through arbitration provisions.  This increasing 
popularity can be attributed to arbitration’s benefits, such as cost and 
time savings.33  Not only do businesses engaged in arbitration benefit 
from this efficiency, but they also limit their exposure to risk because 
of the confidentiality that arbitration provides.34  When disputes 
arbitrate, neutral third parties solve the disagreements rather than the 
court system, which results in a lack of public court records.  For 
businesses, the ability to have disputes invisible to the public provides 
an immeasurable benefit. 
The benefits of arbitration have led to arbitration provisions 
within a myriad of contracts of adhesion.35  Consumer products, 
services, employment, and even medical contracts of adhesion have all 
been littered with arbitration provisions.36  A 2008 empirical study 
revealed that 76.9% of the consumer contracts studied contained 
mandatory arbitration provisions,37 and, as a result of arbitration’s 
 
 32  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009). 
 33  Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001) (“Fair arbitral 
procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may 
benefit workers more than judicial proceedings.”); Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519, 522 (2008) (“[A]nyone with a concern that litigation 
was just too expensive and too inefficient, began to turn to arbitration as a means of 
controlling litigation costs and limiting exposure.”).  
 34  Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands 
Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 34 (2007) (“The limited exposure to risk and 
improved efficiency that arbitration provides for consumer-related industries are the 
two primary benefits businesses derive by contracting for arbitration with 
consumers.”).   
 35  See Pryor, supra note 33. 
 36  See In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. 
Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., concurring) (“The reality is that 
contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with increasing frequency in 
today’s marketplace.”). 
 37  This empirical study looked at 26 consumer contracts and 164 non-consumer 
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benefits listed above, this percentage will likely continue to increase. 
Although the increasing use of arbitration provisions within 
different industries38 allows individuals to experience arbitration’s 
benefits, various disadvantages exist as well.  This Comment divides 
these disadvantages into two groups: (1) lack of information 
disadvantages; and (2) waiving of rights disadvantages. 
Arbitration can be detrimental in particular circumstances due to 
the lack of notice that the absence of court documents creates for 
future or current litigants.  The absence of court records of prior 
disputes between a company and its consumers leaves future 
consumers uninformed of a company’s customer disputes.  An 
arbitrator may rule a certain way “without explanation of [his] reasons 
and without a complete record of [his] proceedings.”39  With such a 
lack of explanation and no public records of prior disputes between a 
retailer and its customers, future customers lose a valuable way of 
assessing the quality of a company’s business relations. 
Arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion also present a 
more prevalent and frequently discussed disadvantage: the waiving of 
an individual’s right to a civil jury trial.  These provisions waive an 
individual’s right to a civil jury trial, in certain cases, which the 
Constitution’s Seventh Amendment and many individual state 
constitutions establish.40  When one waives his right to a civil jury trial, 
 
contracts.  The various consumer contracts in the study were from companies listed in 
Fortune magazine’s top 100 annual rankings of well-known companies within various 
sectors.  Some of these companies included: Cablevision, Verizon, Time Warner, 
Comcast, Chase, American Express, and AT&T.  The results of the empirical study 
found that twenty out of twenty-six consumer contracts, or 76.9%, contained 
mandatory arbitration provisions.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 98083 (2008).   
 38  An empirical study looked at 167 different consumer industries using 
arbitration provisions.  The study broke down these industries into eight broader 
categories: housing & home, rental services, transportation, health care, food & 
entertainment, travel, financial, and other.  In total, 161 different arbitration 
provisions were collected in 2001.  The study revealed that 35.4% of the different 
industries had arbitration provisions within their consumer contracts.  Although this 
percentage seems low, the study’s data was collected over a decade ago.  Surely this 
test, if done today, would yield very different results.  Dermaine & Hensler, supra note 
2, at 60, 63.  
 39  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. 
of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is 
an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.  The change from 
a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate 
result.”).   
 40  In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 827 (“The reality that the average consumer frequently 
loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a 
car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job 
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he also waives all other derivative benefits of having his case heard 
within the courts.  These benefits include time for extended discovery41 
and the right to subpoena witnesses to testify.42  Despite these rights 
being waived, challengers often lose under the FAA when a party 
claims improper waiver.43 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to reverse any longstanding 
judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and to “place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”44  
Under the FAA, courts must treat arbitration provisions as they would 
any other contractual provision and not fashion rules hostile to 
arbitration.45  Although the text of the FAA remains mostly unchanged 
since its 1925 enactment, the same cannot be said for the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the FAA, which became vastly more powerful 
from the 1950s to the present. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2, the “primary substantive 
provision”46 of the FAA, throughout a string of cases described below.  
Section 2 reads: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole 
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.47 
 
 
 
rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”).  
 41  FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.  
 42  FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 43  See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 670 (2001) (“When 
made, such challenges have on rare occasion succeeded.”).   
 44  E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288–89 (2002) (citing Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); see also AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response 
to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”).  
 45  H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters 
of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to 
his agreement.  He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes 
disadvantageous to him.  An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as 
other contracts, where it belongs . . . .”).   
 46  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).   
 47   Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). 
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Section 2 has been broken down into two general clauses: the 
“command clause” and the “savings clause.”48  The first part of § 2, the 
command clause, grants courts the power to find arbitration provisions 
enforceable in contracts described in § 2, while the savings clause 
allows for narrow circumstances where courts can find arbitration 
provisions unenforceable.49  Through a series of Supreme Court cases, 
the Court has given the command clause more power while 
minimizing the savings clause. 
Perhaps the FAA’s most significant expansion was the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of § 2 in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co.,50 where the Court introduced what later became 
known as the doctrine of severability.  With the plaintiff wishing for a 
court to hear the contractual dispute between the parties, the Court 
found that under the FAA, “the federal court is instructed to order 
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that ‘the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration 
agreement] is not in issue.’”51  Before this case, it would have been 
reasonable to assume that under the savings clause, instances of duress 
or other contract formation issues rendered the entire contract, 
including the arbitration provision, unenforceable.  The doctrine of 
severability announced that even when particular contract formation 
problems render a contract otherwise unenforceable, the contract’s 
arbitration provision may be separated and enforced by courts.52 
A broader interpretation of the FAA continued in a series of cases 
from 1983 to 1985.  The Court expressed a newfound federal policy 
favoring arbitration provisions in its Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp.53 dictum and later restated it as part of 
Southland Corp. v. Keating’s54 holding.  In Southland, Chief Justice 
 
 48  Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing 
Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 41011 (2013).   
 49  Id.  
 50  388 U.S. 395 (1967).   
 51  Id. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).   
 52  Essentially, this holding alerted lower courts and future litigants of the FAA’s 
inherent power.  If a party wishes to void a contract on formation defect grounds, and 
the contract includes an arbitration clause, courts must send the case to arbitration 
unless a party alleges a contract formation issue in the inducement of the arbitration 
clause itself.  Id. at 425 (finding that “[i]f there has never been any valid contract, then 
there is not now and never has been anything to arbitrate”). 
 53  460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like 
defense to arbitrability.”).   
 54  465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a 
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a 
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Burger explained that the FAA trumps any state law pertaining to 
arbitration provisions under the Supremacy Clause.55  In her dissent, 
Justice O’Connor argued that the 1925 Congress intended the FAA to 
be procedural in nature rather than substantive and, therefore, should 
not trump state law under Erie.56  Justice O’Connor’s view, however, 
remains unrecognized to this day.57  The Court also found in Southland 
that the FAA trumps all state laws that explicitly prohibit the use of 
arbitration provisions.58 
Beyond interpreting the command clause broadly, the Court has 
interpreted the savings clause narrowly.  It has held that the FAA 
preempts state laws that: (1) outright prohibit arbitration as seen in 
Southland; (2) require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions and 
thus create hostility towards them;59 or (3) conflict with the FAA’s 
purpose.60 
This expansion of the FAA’s power spanned throughout the 
1980s61 and the 1990s62 and continued to the Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.63  In Justice Scalia’s 
Concepcion opinion, the Supreme Court held that § 2 of the FAA 
preempts a California state law known as the Discover Bank rule,64 which 
classifies “most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
 
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to 
resolve by arbitration.”).  
 55  The Supreme Court relied on the Erie Doctrine to assert that in diversity 
jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply their own procedural laws but apply state 
substantive laws.  If a federal law trumps a state substantive law, then the federal law 
prevails.  Therefore, the FAA trumps any state law on this matter.  Id.; see also Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (introducing the Erie Doctrine).  
 56  Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 2123 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 57  See Sura & DeRise, supra note 48, at 411 (“Although Section 2 does not contain 
language expressly preempting state or federal law to the contrary, the Supreme Court 
has long held the provision to have preemptive effect.”).   
 58  Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 35 (finding that FAA trumps California’s Franchise 
Investment Law).  
 59  See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that a 
Montana statute requiring conspicuous notice for any arbitration provision within a 
contract is unenforceable because it conflicts with the FAA since the state statute 
“solely” targeted arbitration provisions).  
 60  See Sura & DeRise, supra note 48, at 411.  
 61  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 
(1985) (holding that arbitration provisions are still enforceable when the issue to be 
decided by an arbitrator involves enforcement of federal law).   
 62  See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (holding that laws specifying how arbitration 
provisions must appear within contracts or any other state law regulating the use of 
arbitration provisions are trumped by the FAA, and even if an arbitration provision 
violates an applicable state law, the provision will still be enforced under the FAA).  
 63  563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 64  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).  
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unconscionable.”65  The California Supreme Court had previously 
upheld the validity of this state rule66 as applied to waivers in either 
judicial or arbitral fora.  Also, “§ 2’s saving clause preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses.”67  Despite these two facts, however, the 
Court reasoned that nothing in the FAA “suggests an intent to preserve 
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA’s objectives.”68  The majority in Concepcion found that the Discover 
Bank rule constituted an obstacle to arbitration and, as a result, was 
trumped by the FAA.  Concepcion’s holding concerns many consumers, 
especially those wishing to engage in class action lawsuits, since the 
Supreme Court’s current treatment of the FAA will trump certain state 
laws enacted in order to protect consumers from unconscionable class 
action waivers within contracts using arbitration provisions.69 
This series of Supreme Court cases has allowed arbitration 
provisions to make their way from business-to-business contracts, 
where the contracting parties are more accustomed to these 
agreements, to business-to-consumer contracts.70  With the Supreme 
Court’s blessing, many well-known companies placed mandatory 
arbitration provisions within their consumer contracts, including: 
Verizon, Sprint, DIRECTV, AT&T, Sony, Dell, Gateway, and Toshiba.71  
Also, after courts found that contracting parties could indicate 
 
 65  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340.  
 66  The California Supreme Court previously upheld the validity of this state law in 
Discover Bank.  113 P.3d at 1100.  This law became known as the Discover Bank Rule.  
The Rule essentially made class action waivers in certain consumer contracts under 
particular circumstances unconscionable under California contract law.  As a result, 
these waivers fell under the savings clause of § 2.   
 67  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.  
 68  Id.  
 69  Alliance for Justice, One Year Later: The Consequences of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, JUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 27, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://afjjusticewatch. 
blogspot.com/2012/04/one-year-later-consequences-of-at.html (“The Court held in 
Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’)’s favorable treatment of 
contractual arbitration clauses preempts state laws aimed at protecting consumers and 
employees from unconscionable class action waivers.”); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (stating that Concepcion “broadly validat[ed] 
arbitration provisions containing class action waivers”).   
 70  See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1636 (2005) (attributing the great increase of binding arbitration provisions 
within consumer contracts to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions). 
 71  Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
forced-arbitration-rogues-gallery (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the enforceability of arbitration 
provision found within the warranty brochure included with a computer purchase, 
thus showing the presence of arbitration provisions in consumer goods contracts).  
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acceptance of an agreement’s terms by mere actions rather than 
necessitating a signature, companies then began to include arbitration 
provisions within their online consumer contracts.72  This trend quickly 
spread and explains why many popular online retailers include 
arbitration provisions within their online contracting, including: 
Amazon, Barnes & Nobles, Netflix, Microsoft, Groupon, eBay, and 
Dell.73  These provisions allow online retailers to reap the benefits of 
arbitration but at the same time pose disadvantages to the average 
online consumer who lacks actual knowledge of the online contract’s 
terms, including its arbitration provision. 
 
 
 72  See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“We readily conclude that no signature is needed to satisfy the FAA’s written 
agreement requirement.”); Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 
1987) (stating that “while the [FAA] requires a writing, it does not require that the 
writing be signed by the parties”); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 
64 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that “a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate 
even in the absence of his signature”); Linea Naviera De Cabotaje, C.A. v. Mar Caribe 
De Navegacion, C.A., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“While an 
agreement to arbitrate must be in writing, there is no requirement that the writing be 
signed.”).  
 73  PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 71.  The arbitration provisions found on eBay’s and 
Dell’s websites are listed below as examples of what arbitration provisions within these 
online contracts look like.  EBay’s User Agreement contains the following arbitration 
provision:  
You and eBay each agree that any and all disputes or claims that have 
arisen or may arise between you and eBay relating in any way to or arising 
out of this or previous versions of the User Agreement, your use of or 
access to eBay’s Services, or any products or services sold, offered, or 
purchased through eBay’s Services shall be resolved exclusively through 
final and binding arbitration, rather than in court.  Alternatively, you 
may assert your claims in small claims court, if your claims qualify and so 
long as the matter remains in such court and advances only on an 
individual (non-class, non-representative) basis. The Federal Arbitration 
Act governs the interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement to 
Arbitrate.  
eBay User Agreement, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html?rt=nc (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).   
Dell’s Consumer Terms of Sale provides the following agreement:  
Dispute Resolution and Binding Arbitration. YOU AND DELL ARE 
AGREEING TO GIVE UP ANY RIGHTS TO LITIGATE CLAIMS IN A 
COURT OR BEFORE A JURY, OR TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS 
ACTION OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO A 
CLAIM. OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU WOULD HAVE IF YOU WENT 
TO COURT MAY ALSO BE UNAVAILABLE OR MAY BE LIMITED IN 
ARBITRATION. 
Consumer Terms of Sale, DELL, http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/vn/terms-of-sale-
consumer (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).   
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IV. THE SEMINAL CASE OF SPECHT74 
Case law regarding online contracts in generaly is still sparse and 
rather new.75  In particular, case law revolving around browse-wrap 
agreements is even newer; in fact, no court addressed the 
enforceability of such agreements prior to 2000.76  The 2002 Second 
Circuit case of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,77 which some 
courts have relied upon for guidance, ought to be followed by many 
other courts for its constructive knowledge analysis pertaining to 
browse-wrap agreements. 
Specht involved a class action lawsuit by a group of online users 
who downloaded free software from Netscape’s website and had their 
personal information secretively obtained by Netscape when the 
downloads were initiated.78  In the district court, defendant Netscape 
moved to compel arbitration under its browse-wrap agreement’s 
arbitration provision.  The browse-wrap agreement appeared via a 
hyperlink at the very bottom of the webpage.  To find the hyperlink, 
plaintiffs needed to scroll past an enticing “Download” button that 
plaintiffs clicked to obtain the free software.79  Had plaintiffs scrolled 
and clicked on this hyperlink, they would then have seen the “License 
& Support Agreements” housing the arbitration provision that 
Netscape wished to enforce.80 
The Second Circuit denied Netscape’s motion to compel 
arbitration, finding that the downloaders of the software did not assent 
to the terms of the browse-wrap agreement.81  Since the downloaders 
denied actual knowledge of the browse-wrap’s terms, the court needed 
 
 74  See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 791 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (describing Specht as the “seminal browse-wrap case”).  
 75  See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 8283.   
 76  See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (“No 
reported cases have ruled on the enforceability of a browse wrap license.”); see also 
Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a Prerequisite For Contract Formation in Today’s E-Conomy?, 
78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 26667 (2003) (“Prior to 2000, no court had addressed the 
issue.”). 
 77  306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. at 23. 
 80  “Had plaintiffs scrolled down instead of acting on defendants’ invitation to click 
on the ‘Download’ button, they would have encountered the following invitation: 
‘Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload software license 
agreement before downloading and using the software.’”  Id.  The whole agreement did 
not appear at the bottom of this screen, but rather the agreement’s terms were 
contained in a hyperlink that directed users to the page entitled “License & Support 
Agreements.”  Id. at 2324.  The agreement required users of the website to read its 
terms and agree to them prior to downloading any software.  Id. at 24.  
 81  Id. at 17. 
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to determine whether sufficient constructive knowledge of the terms 
and conditions existed.  This inquiry does not consider whether a 
reasonably prudent website user would have read the terms of the 
agreement, but rather would have noticed their presence at all.82  In 
determining constructive knowledge, the Specht court recognized that 
Netscape’s online users “could not have learned of the existence of 
[these] terms unless, prior to executing the download, they had 
scrolled down the webpage to a screen located below the download 
button.”83  The Specht court found that a reasonably prudent user would 
not have scrolled past an enticing “Download” button to find the 
hyperlink of the browse-wrap agreement at the bottom of Netscape’s 
webpage.  As a result, no constructive knowledge existed, and the 
arbitration provision within Netscape’s browse-wrap agreement was 
not enforced.84 
Although the Specht court’s reasoning involved website users 
downloading free software, the case has been applied to situations 
involving online retailers and consumers.85  The Ninth Circuit recently 
 
 82  Id. at 23. 
 83  Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.  
 84  See id. at 31 (“We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these 
circumstances would have known of the existence of license terms.”); see also id. at 32 
(stating that in circumstances where Internet users are urged to download something 
immediately by clicking a button, “a reference to the existence of license terms on a 
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive 
notice of those terms”). 
 85  Three of the main cases relying on Specht involve online retailers: 
Overstock.com, United Marketing Group, and Zappos.com.  In Hines v. Overstock.com, 
the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of a browse-wrap agreement in a case 
where plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Overstock.com after the online 
retailer tried to charge a thirty-dollar “restocking fee” to its customers returning items.  
380 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2010).  The online retailer, much like Netscape in the 
Specht case, asked the court to compel arbitration due to the arbitration provision 
found in the online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement housed within a hyperlink at the 
bottom of its webpage.  Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010).  The Hines Court found that 
neither actual knowledge of these terms and conditions nor constructive knowledge 
of the terms and conditions were present; without proper assent, the arbitration 
provision could not be enforced.  Hines, 380 F. App’x at 24.   
  In Van Tassell v. United Marketing Group, plaintiff-customers brought suit against 
defendants who again had arbitration provisions within browse-wrap agreements 
housed in hyperlinks at the bottom of defendants’ websites.  795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 770 
(N.D. Ill. 2011).  Just like in Overstock.com, this district court also applied Specht to an 
online shopping scenario.  Id. at 793.   
  Finally, In re Zappos.com, Inc. provides another situation where plaintiffs wished 
to sue an online shoe retailer regarding their purchases through the retailer’s website.  
893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012).  To avoid a class action lawsuit, the defendant, 
Zappos, moved the court to compel arbitration as a result of the arbitration provision 
found in its browse-wrap agreement.  The agreement could be found by clicking a 
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applied Specht’s reasoning in analyzing the enforceability of an online 
retailer’s browse-wrap agreement in Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles, Inc.86  In 
Nguyen, the plaintiff-consumer purchased a tablet from Barnes & 
Nobles’ website during a sale but later found out that due to excessive 
demand, the item was out of stock.87  The consumer brought a punitive 
class action against the retailer alleging deceptive business practices 
and false advertising, but the defendant moved to compel arbitration 
under its browse-wrap agreement’s arbitration provision.88  As in Specht, 
the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen looked to the conspicuousness and 
placement of the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement to 
determine the existence of constructive notice and, therefore, 
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms.89  The court found 
no constructive notice because the online retailer made the terms of 
its agreement available only by hyperlink at the bottom of its 
webpage.90  Although the link was conspicuous to those who scrolled 
down, the online retailer did not prompt the consumer to continue 
scrolling or in any other way inform the consumer that such agreement 
existed.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hyperlink labeled “Terms of Use” on Zappos’ website.  Id. at 1063.  Since there was no 
evidence of actual knowledge by the consumers of the browse-wrap’s terms, the court 
looked to constructive knowledge.  Id. at 1064.  The hyperlink to the “Terms of Use” 
was located between the middle and bottom of each page of the website.  The 
hyperlink, however, was visible only if the user scrolled down.  If a consumer printed 
a physical copy of the defendant’s homepage, the hyperlink would appear on the third 
of four pages.  Id.  Also, the website did not direct a user to the hyperlink upon creating 
an account, making a purchase, or logging into an existing account.  Id.  Based on 
these findings and relying on Specht, the court found that “[n]o reasonable user would 
have reason to click on the Terms of Use,” and the link is “inconspicuous, buried in 
the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage.”  Id.  Therefore, once again, 
another court relied on the Specht reasoning to find a lack of constructive knowledge 
of an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement.   
 86  763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 87  Id. at 1173. 
 88  Id. at 1174. 
 89  Id. at 1177.  
 90  Id. at 1179. 
 91  Id. 
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 Although a series of cases92 involving the enforceability of browse-
wrap agreements containing arbitration provisions have relied upon 
Specht, those courts have failed to explore the psychological reasoning 
behind Specht.  In understanding why courts should adopt Specht’s 
reasoning as a rule of law93 to eliminate inconsistent results of what 
constitutes constructive knowledge of a browse-wrap agreement’s 
terms, courts cannot underestimate the importance of the human 
psyche.  Specht ought to be applied to all online retailing cases that 
question the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements precisely 
because psychological studies support its holding. 
V. WHY STATES SHOULD RELY ON SPECHT FOR GUIDANCE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS94 
A. The Power of the Impulse Buy 
Cases adopting the reasoning in Specht, as well as psychological 
studies involving online shoppers, both discuss that online shoppers 
usually would not scroll past enticing items for sale in order to find a 
hyperlink containing an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement.  A 
majority of purchases made by today’s consumers, approximately 
seventy-five to eighty percent, are categorized as impulse buys.95  These 
 
 92  Specht was the first of a string of both state and federal cases addressing the 
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements in consumer transactions.  A preliminary 
draft of the Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts claims that “out of a total of 
27 cases starting with Specht in 2002 and ending with Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles . . . 
courts enforced browsewraps in all eight cases where the website included both a 
prominent statement of notice and conspicuous, accessible hyperlinks to the terms.”  
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. Proposed Draft No. 1, 2014) (internal 
citation omitted).  Furthermore, “in all 14 cases where the website lacked both a 
prominent statement of notice and conspicuous hyperlinks to the terms, courts reused 
enforcement of the browsewrap for failure to provide sufficient notice.”  Id. 
 93  Since the idea of assent, which is shown by either actual or constructive 
knowledge, is an issue of state contract law, this Comment suggests that the highest 
state courts look toward Specht and adopt its reasoning and the reasoning that this 
Comment emphasizes.  If state legislatures want to pass legislation regarding their 
states’ contract laws, these legislative bodies should also consider the reasoning of 
Specht and this Comment for online retailers. 
 94  The field of psychology and psychological studies have important implications 
when dealing with law and determining the practicality of certain applications of the 
law.  McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15 (Fla. 1998) (noting the “establishment 
of the scientific respectability of psychology and its use and effect on the law”).  
 95  See Pranjal Gupta, Shopping Impulses, Online vs. Off, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011, 8:18 
AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/12/01/save-america-shop-at-
work/shopping-impulses-online-vs-off (finding impulse buying increasingly common 
and resulting in up to two-thirds of all purchases); see also Veronika Svatošová, 
Motivation of Online Buyer Behavior, J. COMPETITIVENESS, Sept. 2013, at 14, 21, 
http://www.cjournal.cz/files/141.pdf (“Experience and global [research] show that 
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impulse buys occur frequently and cost consumers large sums of 
money.96  An impulse buy occurs when a consumer has a sudden urge 
to buy something and acts upon that urge.97  Although not all online 
shoppers visit websites with the intent to make a purchase,98 many of 
these consumers ultimately give in to these impulses because of 
strategies implemented by many online retailers.99  Online retailers will 
place popular or sale items on their homepages in hopes of 
encouraging online browsers to give in to the powerful urge of the 
impulse buy.  Customers will simply click on a strategically placed item 
on a retailer’s website and proceed to checkout without any need of 
further exploring the retailer’s site. 
Traditional brick-and-mortar stores are notorious for triggering 
impulse sales by using techniques such as strategically placing low-
priced items close to checkout stations.  As online shopping increased 
in popularity,100 online retailers quickly learned how to replicate the 
 
only 20% of all purchases are planned, the remaining 80% are impulsive, based on 
emotions.”); Brad Tuttle, Millennials Are Biggest Suckers for Selfish Impulse Buys, TIME 
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/27/millennials-are-biggest-
suckers-for-selfish-impulse-buys/ (citing finding by brand-research firm, the Integer 
Group, which notes that Millennials, or those born between 1980 and 1995, are the 
most likely to engage in impulse buying). 
 96  According to a study conducted by Npower, an organization specializing in 
technological services, the average consumer spends approximately $114,293 in his 
lifetime on impulse buys.  The most common items that a consumer buys impulsively 
include: “food, clothing, magazines, wine, books, DVDs, shoes, trips, beer, . . . 
toiletries, home furnishings, music, clothes for the kids, jewelry, accessories, gadgets, 
garden accessories, flowers, toys, and day trips.”  Megan Pacheco, Is Impulse Buying 
Destroying Your Finances?, MVELOPES (Sept. 3, 2013, 2:42 AM), 
http://www.mvelopes.com/is-impulse-buying-destroying-your-finances/.   
 97  John LaCour, How Proper Marketing Tactics Can Attract More Impulse Buyers, DMN3 
BLOG (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.dmn3.com/dmn3-blog/how-proper-marketing-
tactics-can-attract-more-impulse-buyers (“Impulse buying is an unplanned, spur-of-the-
moment action/behavior.”).  
 98  For example, an individual may visit different webpages to compare prices for 
a particular item.  See Jiafeng Li, Study: Online Shopping Behavior in t he Digital Era, 
IACQUIRE BLOG (May 10, 2013), http://www.iacquire.com/blog/study-online-
shopping-behavior-in-the-digital-era (“[Thirty-nine percent] of online shoppers 
strongly agree that ‘for relatively expensive items, I’ll shop at different stores to make 
certain I get the best price.’”).  
 99  See infra Part V.B.  
 100  See Li, supra note 98 (“According to Forrester Research, the online retail sales 
volume for the US 2012 is $231 billion.  This figure is predicted to grow continually to 
$370 billion in 2017.  Forrester also reports that 53% of people in the US shopped 
online in 2011 and it is predicted to grow to 58% in 2016 . . . .”); Tongxiao (Catherine) 
Zhang et al., The Value of IT-Enabled Retailer Learning: Personalized Product 
Recommendations and Customer Store Loyalty in Electronic Markets, MIS QUARTERLY, Dec. 
2011, at 859, 860 (noting that according to Census Bureau of the Department of 
Commerce (2008), e-commerce sales in 2007 increased by nineteen percent from 2006 
to equal $136.4 billion). 
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techniques used in brick-and-mortar stores by placing particular items 
on homepages or on the screen displayed right before online 
checkout.  The phenomenon of impulse buying in brick-and-mortar 
stores has quickly made its way to the online shopping industry due to 
present-day technological advances, especially online 
recommendation systems discussed infra.101 
The concept of online impulse buying is not the only reason to 
support the Specht court’s finding of no constructive notice and, 
therefore, no constructive knowledge.  “Eye tracking” studies show that 
online consumers generally have a tendency to pay very little attention 
to the bottom of a retailer’s webpage.102  Such studies use either remote 
or head-mounted monitoring devices to record eye movement of a 
website’s viewers.103  The eye-tracking devices then compile the results 
to show researchers where online viewers looked and for how long.104  
Many of these eye-tracking studies performed for online retailers 
support the Specht court’s finding that online consumers are not on 
constructive notice of a given provision housed at the very bottom of a 
webpage.  These studies show that an online consumer’s attention 
trails off as the consumer begins to scroll down a webpage.  According 
to these studies, web users spend eighty percent of their viewing time 
“above the fold,” meaning the area of the webpage visible to viewers 
without scrolling.105  Even if the online consumer does scroll “past the 
fold,” he gives this area of the website only one-fourth of the attention 
he gave to the area “above the fold.”106  Most browse-wrap agreements 
 
 101  See Dhanila Veena Parboteeah, A Model of Online Impulse Buying: An 
Empirical Study (Aug. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Washington State 
University) (on file with the Washington State University Department of Information 
Systems).  
 102   Many marketing giants, including Nielson Norman Group, utilize these studies 
in order to see exactly where online users look when viewing webpages.  Many online 
retailers can hire these marketing companies to learn their customers’ propensities.  
Based on these studies, online retailers can place important notices or attractive items 
in areas with the highest visual traffic.  See KARA PERNICE & JAKOB NIELSON, NIELSON 
NORMAN GRP., HOW TO CONDUCT EYETRACKING STUDIES (2014), 
http://www.nngroup.com/reports/how-to-conduct-eyetracking-studies/. 
 103  See About Us: What is Eyetracking?, EYETRACKING, http://www.eyetracking.com/ 
About-Us/What-Is-Eye-Tracking (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).  
 104  Id.   
 105  How People Read on the Web, CENTER FOR PARENT INFO. AND RES. (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/web-reading/.  See also Neil Patel, 8 
Powerful Takeaways from Eye Tracking Studies, QUICKSPROUT BLOG (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.quicksprout.com/2014/04/16/8-powerful-takeaways-from-eye-tracking-
studies/; Jaan M. Sonberg, 19 Things We Can Learn From Numerous Heatmap Tests, 
CONVERSIONXL BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://conversionxl.com/19-things-we-can-learn-
from-numerous-heatmap-tests/#.  
 106  CENTER FOR PARENT INFO. AND RES., supra note 105. 
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will be housed “below the fold” in hidden hyperlinks where consumers’ 
attention spans wane.107  These eye-tracking studies and other 
psychological studies regarding impulse buying reveal that online 
consumers will rarely view the bottom of an online retailer’s webpage, 
thus supporting the Specht court’s finding of no constructive notice. 
B. Online Recommendation Systems Increase the Likelihood of Impulse 
Buys 
Although impulse buys occur online without the use of product 
recommendation systems (PRSs),108 the likelihood of an impulse buy 
occurring increases exponentially when online retailers use such 
systems.109  The increase of impulse buys from the use of online PRSs 
comes from the fact that, as the ease of buying increases, so too does 
the likelihood of an impulse buy.110  An online retailer can now use 
technology to its advantage by highlighting an item in which the 
consumer has shown an interest, thereby creating an easier buying 
situation for that consumer; the consumer only needs to click to 
purchase an item rather than navigate through a retailer’s website.111 
These recommendation systems work by studying saved and 
aggregated historical data of an individual consumer based on his 
 
 107  In a personal study conducted for the purpose of this Comment, the websites 
of the top 2014 retailers reported by the National Retail Federation (www.nfr.com) 
were analyzed.  With retailers in the categories of “Leading Department Stores,” “Mass 
Merchants,” “Apparel Merchants,” and “Sporting Goods Merchants,” each and every 
leading retailer analyzed in these various categories had browse-wrap agreements 
housed at the very bottom of their webpages.  Furthermore, these browse-wraps were 
not visible without scrolling to the bottom of the webpage. 
 108  For example, Wal-Mart and Target have offered “deals of the day” to entice 
online shoppers into impulse purchases.  With these deals offered as soon as an online 
shopper enters the website, this entices the customer to click the item and immediately 
add it to his virtual shopping cart.  The online retailers do not show these items to 
particular shoppers because of data collected pertaining to their prior purchase or 
browsing histories, but these are simply daily deals analogous to the sale items many 
brick-and-mortar stores place close to the registers.  Krystina Gustafson, The Holy Grail 
of Online: Getting You To Spend More, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2014, 11:03 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101461802.  
 109  Gupta, supra note 95 (noting that these “various online product suggestion 
tools . . . may create more impulse sales”); see Wen-Yu Tsao, The Fitness of Product 
Information: Evidence From Online Recommendations, INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. Feb. 2013, at 1, 
1 (noting that one main reason for online retailers to use these recommendation 
systems is to influence a customer’s purchasing behavior, essentially trying to cause 
impulse buys).  
 110  Parboteeah, supra note 101, at 39 (noting the “positive relationship between the 
ease of buying and impulse buying”). 
 111  See id. at 40 (“Personalization is another aspect of a website that enhances online 
purchasing, whereby each visitor is considered as an individual and the website content 
is tailored to the needs and preferences of the individual.”). 
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prior activity on the retailer’s website, including prior purchases and 
previously viewed products.112  These systems then employ algorithms 
using this collected data to determine an individual’s potential 
interests by comparing his prior activity to other visitors of the retail 
website with similar tastes.113  The product recommendations appear 
on a shopper’s sidebars or anywhere else in plain view for the 
consumer.  Some online retailers, such as Pottery Barn, take these 
recommendation systems one step further by e-mailing 
recommendations to consumers.114  By simply clicking on the e-mailed 
image of the product sent to him by the online retailer, the consumer 
will be directed to the retailer’s webpage where he can immediately 
purchase that item.115  PRSs are just one of the many different 
personalization tools used by online retailers to increase the likelihood 
of impulse buys.116 
Many online retailers, including SkyMall,117 Bluefly,118 and eBay,119 
followed the pioneer of recommendation systems, Amazon,120 to make 
recommendation systems “quietly ubiquitous” by 2010.121  As the use of 
recommendation systems increased, so too did online retailers’ sales.  
In 2012, Amazon reported that a twenty-nine percent sales increase 
during its second fiscal quarter could be attributed to the company’s 
use of recommendation systems that prompt consumers to make 
 
 112  See Daniel Baier & Eva Stüber, Acceptance of Recommendations To Buy in Online 
Retailing, J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS., May 2010, at 173, 174 (“Recommender 
systems use the consumer’s saved and aggregated historical data to provide 
recommendations; they register the latest navigation and consumer behavior and 
consider additional information, or rather, they generate various combinations from 
suitable data sources.”). 
 113  See Susan Gregory Thomas, Getting to Know You.com, EBSCOHOST (Nov. 15, 
1999), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN= 
2447180&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  
 114  Gustafson, supra note 108 (“Stores like Pottery Barn send recommendations 
based on past purchases and encourage shoppers to pull the trigger on abandoned 
digital shopping carts.”).  
 115  See id. 
 116  Within the broad category of product recommendation systems, there are 
different types of recommendation systems.  One of the more popular systems, for 
example, is collaborate filtering.  Collaborate filtering “works on the principle that the 
behavior of a lot of people can be used to make educated guesses about the behavior 
of a single individual.”  Thomas, supra note 113. 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id.  
 119  Tsao, supra note 109. 
 120  See Baier & Stüber, supra note 112; see also Lev Grossman, How Computers Know 
What We Want—Before We Do, TIME (May 27, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,1992403,00.html.  
 121  Grossman, supra note 120.  
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purchases they did not originally intend to make.122 
Now, online retailers can not only place popular items in front of 
their visitors, but can also make sure those items have a high likelihood 
of being purchased by a given visitor.123  Due to the natural human 
tendency to impulse buy and the increased use of PRSs, an online 
retailer’s display of products for an online consumer to click and 
purchase is equally as enticing as the “Download” button in Specht.  
Both the “Download” button and the online products encourage 
website viewers to immediately click without scrolling further.  By 
clicking in both situations, the online user enters into a browse-wrap 
agreement, most likely including a mandatory arbitration provision, 
without having any reason to scroll down to the bottom of the 
webpage.124  As a rule of law, courts ought to find constructive 
knowledge lacking in these situations.  Adopting the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning in Specht, there is logically no constructive knowledge 
because no reasonable online consumer would scroll past enticing 
items for sale in order to find a hyperlink hidden at the bottom of a 
webpage that contained the browse-wrap agreement. 
 
 
 
 122  JP Mangalindan, Amazon’s Recommendation Secret, FORTUNE (July 30, 2012, 11:09 
AM), http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/amazons-recommendation-secret/ (“The 
company reported a 29% sales increase to $12.83 billion during its second fiscal 
quarter, up from $9.9 billion during the same time last year.  A lot of that growth 
arguably has to do with the way Amazon has integrated recommendations into nearly 
every part of the purchasing process from product discovery to checkout.”).   
 123  See Sylvain Senecal & Jacques Nantel, The Influence of Online Product 
Recommendations on Consumers’ Online Choices, J. RETAILING, Aug. 2004, at 159, 166 
(noting an empirical study showing that consumers exposed to product 
recommendations were more likely to make a purchase than those who were not so 
exposed, concluding that “online product recommendations greatly influenced 
subjects’ product choices”); Zhang et al., supra note 100, at 861 (“Personalization 
technologies enable a retailer to leverage customers’ previous buying habits and 
customer profile information to make automatic decisions about what data to display 
to the user and how to display it.”). 
 124  Clicking on a product while online shopping merely places the item in a virtual 
shopping cart.  In completing the purchase, however, the online consumer again clicks 
an enticing “Checkout” button without having to scroll down to the bottom of a 
webpage to find the hyperlink housing the browse-wrap.  This “Checkout” button 
becomes analogous to the “Download” button in Specht.  In a study conducted for 
purposes of this Comment, using the top retailers of 2014 listed by the National Retail 
Federation, out of the same group of retailers studied for purposes of supra note 107, 
no online retailer mentioned its terms and conditions (housing the browse-wrap 
agreements) in an area above the “Checkout” button.  
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ONLINE RETAILERS 
The need to create rules of law to determine what constitutes 
constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, especially those 
including arbitration provisions, has never been more important.  
First, online shopping has steadily increased over time and sales have 
been projected to reach $370 billion by 2017.125  Second, the use of 
arbitration provisions within these browse-wrap agreements by online 
retailers has also increased,126 leaving naïve consumers to experience 
the disadvantages of mandatory arbitration.127  Although online 
retailers’ browse-wrap agreements contain many provisions other than 
arbitration provisions, the prevalence of arbitration provisions and the 
negative consequences associated with taking a consumer’s claim out 
of the court system necessitate prompt action by the courts. 
This Comment first suggests a rule of law declaring browse-wrap 
agreements housed within hyperlinks at the bottom of online retailers’ 
webpages, below enticing products for consumers to click, 
unenforceable.  The reasonable online consumer, triggered by a 
compulsion to impulse buy, would fail to scroll to the bottom of the 
webpage to put himself on notice.  Next, this Comment makes 
suggestions for online retailers to render their browse-wrap 
agreements enforceable.  These suggestions consider both an online 
retailer’s desire to make sales without scaring off potential consumers 
with click-wrap agreements and the importance of providing 
customers with sufficient constructive knowledge. 
Other legal scholars have made different suggestions regarding 
how courts should treat browse-wrap agreements.128  With legal scholars 
making different suggestions and without clear guidance from state 
supreme courts, attorneys remain baffled over how to advise clients on 
this topic.129  The most common suggestions from legal scholars 
encompass two extreme and opposite approaches: (1) courts should 
enforce only click-wrap agreements;130 or (2) courts should enforce all 
 
 125  See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 126  See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 127  See supra Part II.A. 
 128  See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 76, at 265; Streeter, supra note 24, at 1363. 
 129  Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in 
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 288 (2003) (“The shortfall in the browse-
wrap case law and the lack of consensus among scholars has left attorneys in a quandary 
as to how to advise clients who want to rely upon—or already are relying upon—
browse-wrap agreements to contractually bind the users of their Web sites or software, 
or clients who need to know whether they are bound by the terms of a Web site they 
may have viewed.”).  
 130  See Robertson, supra note 76, at 267 (insisting that courts “enforce online 
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browse-warp agreements, even if hidden at the bottom of a webpage.131  
When applied to the online retailing industry, these two approaches 
have flaws that can only be ameliorated by a middle-ground approach. 
If online retailers relied only on click-wrap agreements, where 
consumers need to affirmatively check a box or click an “I Agree” 
button prior to entering a retailer’s webpage, consumers would likely 
become frustrated.  Even if this simple affirmative act takes merely 
seconds to perform, consumers could become weary of an online 
retailer’s policies if the retailer used a click-wrap agreement.  Click-
wrap agreements, an unorthodox contracting method for online 
retailers,132 could possibly lead consumers to take their business 
elsewhere (perhaps to an online retailer incorporated in a state 
without a law requiring click-wrap agreements or even to a traditional 
brick-and-mortar store).  Click-wrap agreements can create a lack of 
trust between the consumer and the online retailer, and a lack of trust 
negatively affects online sales revenue.133  By studying over thirty of 
2014’s top online retailers as reported by the National Retail 
Federation, none of the online retailers used click-wrap contracts but 
they all used browse-wrap contracts.134  Wanting to conform to these 
industry norms, many online retailers surely would prefer browse-wrap 
agreements to click-wrap agreements and would perhaps even lobby 
against any state law requiring the use of click-wrap agreements.135 
Similarly, an approach finding all browse-wrap agreements 
enforceable would be easier to apply than a middle-ground approach, 
but would be unjust for online consumers.  As suggested throughout 
this Comment, a browse-wrap agreement hidden at the bottom of a 
retailer’s webpage does not put a reasonable consumer on notice of 
the agreement’s terms.  While online retailers would push for 
 
contracts only where users have adequate notice of the terms and conditions and 
affirmatively agree to be bound by such terms”). 
 131  See Streeter, supra note 24, at 1389 (“The distinction between browse-wrap and 
other types of licenses is illogical, unnecessary, and potentially detrimental to the 
future development of Internet commerce.”).   
 132  See supra note 107. 
 133  See Chih-Chien Wang et al., The Impact of Knowledge and Trust on E-Consumers’ 
Online Shopping Activities: An Empirical Study, J. COMPUTERS, Jan. 2009, at 11, 16 (“The 
results of this empirical study revealed that trust in online shopping is positively 
associated with online shopping activities.”).   
 134  See supra note 107.  
 135  Even if a state law required all of its online retailers to use click-wrap 
agreements, online consumers may still be angry.  Such a law in one particular state 
would not prevent online retailers incorporated in other states from using browse-wrap 
agreements.  Such a scenario would put online retailers in the state forbidding browse-
wrap agreements at a supposed disadvantage over other online retailers.  
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legislation implementing this theory, many consumers would be 
troubled by such an act. 
Both online retailers and consumers would support a middle-
ground approach, and as a result, it must be implemented.  State 
legislatures and courts must also comply with the FAA,136 as well as the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),137 in determining an approach 
for dealing with online browse-wrap agreements containing arbitration 
provisions.  All states except Louisiana138 have adopted the U.C.C., 
including Article 2, which governs the sale of “goods.”139  Although 
individual states have adopted the U.C.C. with variations made by their 
state legislatures, these variations are minor, and “the similarities of all 
states’ U.C.C[.] provisions . . . far outweigh the differences.”140  Since 
online retailers sell movable goods, among other things, the U.C.C. 
would apply to such transactions.  States must be sure to abide by the 
provisions of the U.C.C. when considering rules of law pertaining to 
online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.141 
The middle-ground approach this Comment suggests 
recommends two techniques online retailers can implement so that 
courts find constructive knowledge and therefore enforce the retailers’ 
browse-wrap agreements.  First, online retailers could place their 
“Terms and Conditions” hyperlink across the top of their websites 
rather than at the very bottom.  Online consumers read from top to 
bottom, so following the website’s homepage from top to bottom, the 
reasonable customer would presumably come across this hyperlink 
before being persuaded to click on and purchase the enticing items 
for sale.142  This recommendation avoids the problems noted in Specht 
 
 136  All state laws must still comply with the FAA since the Supreme Court has found 
that the FAA trumps state law.  If these browse-wrap agreements contain arbitration 
provisions, which many do, then states must make sure to comply with both the FAA 
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute over the years.  See supra Part III. 
 137  U.C.C. (2015).  
 138  THOMPSON PUBL’G GRP., NATURAL GAS CONTRACTS ¶ 401.003 (1996) (“The 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (‘UCC’) deals with every aspect of sales of 
‘goods’ . . . . The UCC has been adopted in every state but Louisiana, and the UCC is 
indeed uniform, with the exception of some changes in individual states.  The 
similarities of all states’ UCC provisions, however, far outweigh the differences.”). 
 139  The U.C.C. Article 2 applies to the sale of “movable” goods.  U.C.C. § 2-105(1).  
Clearly, online retailers sell goods to online consumers that fit this description.   
 140  THOMPSON PUBL’G GRP., supra note 138. 
 141  See supra text accompanying note 139.  
 142  Studies have shown that an individual’s tendency to read from top to bottom 
varies depending on the mode in which a given document is presented to the reader.  
The study showed that for online reading, as opposed to face-to-face reading, readers 
were more likely to read from top to bottom.  Olena Kaminska & Tom Foulsham, Real-
world Eye-tracking in Face-to-face, Web and SAQ Modes, ISER WORKING PAPER SERIES, June 
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and highlighted through the psychological and eye-tracking studies of 
this Comment, which found that no reasonable consumer would scroll 
past enticing items in order to find the hyperlink at the bottom of a 
webpage.  Under this technique, there is no scrolling required to see 
the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement, and, because 
reasonable consumers read from top to bottom, they would have an 
opportunity to see the hyperlink prior to both placing the item within 
their shopping carts and checking out. 
The second recommendation of this middle-ground approach 
suggests that retailers place the hyperlinks to these agreements above 
the “Complete Purchase” button on their webpages.143  Again, keeping 
in mind a consumer’s tendency to read from top to bottom,144 having 
this hyperlink above the enticing “Complete Purchase” button would 
put a reasonable online consumer on notice and therefore constitutes 
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms prior to purchasing 
an item.145 
These two suggestions not only consider the reasoning of the 
Specht court and the psychological analysis of online consumers 
explored in this Comment, but also take into consideration the 
statutory requirements of the FAA and the U.C.C.  First, many of these 
browse-wrap agreements contain arbitration provisions146 and 
therefore must comply with the FAA since this Act trumps all state laws 
 
2013, at 1, 11, https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/working-
papers/iser/2013-07.pdf (“The reading order of response options varies much across 
modes: sequential reading of response options was found dominant in SAQ mode 
followed by web mode, and rather uncommon in face-to-face mode.”).   
 143  This second suggestion implements the reasoning from Specht as well as the 
cases following Specht.  Under this reasoning, the consumer has a reasonable 
opportunity to see the hyperlink above an enticing button to click rather than having 
to scroll past such an enticing button to find the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap 
agreement. 
 144  Karminska & Foulsham, supra note 142, at “Non-technical summary” (“But 
reading response options in order [from top to bottom] is more common in web and 
paper and pencil modes than in face-to-face.”).  
 145  This second suggestion is very similar to what happened in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 
841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  In Fteja, the court enforced a browse-wrap 
agreement because right underneath the “Sign Up” button to create the account, it 
clearly stated: “By clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you have read and agree to 
the Terms of Service.”  Id. at 835, 841.  The only difference that this Comment suggests 
for online retailers is to place the hyperlink above instead of below the enticing button 
that prompts a consumer to click.  This recommendation stems from the psychological 
findings discussed within this Comment regarding an online shopper’s eagerness to 
click in order to complete an impulse buy.  See supra Part V. 
 146  Allstar Homes v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., concurring) 
(“The reality is that contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with 
increasing frequency in today’s marketplace.”). 
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regarding arbitration provisions.147  The recommendations of this 
middle-ground approach do not: (1) outright prohibit arbitration; (2) 
require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions, thus creating 
hostility towards them; or (3) conflict with the FAA’s purpose.148  Under 
these three circumstances, the Supreme Court has found state laws 
unenforceable, but because the two recommendations of this 
Comment do not violate these three requirements, the FAA should not 
trump state laws adopting these two suggested approaches. 
The recommendations of this middle-ground approach must also 
comply with Article 2 of the U.C.C. because online retailers often sell 
movable goods.  For online retailers to be sure that a court does not 
find its hyperlinks containing the terms of a browse-wrap agreement 
unenforceable under the U.C.C., these retailers may also want to make 
sure their hyperlinks are conspicuous if the agreements themselves 
contain any disclaimers of warranty.149  Although the U.C.C. does not 
explicitly require this, online retailers should take the extra 
precaution.  “Conspicuous” has been defined as something “so written, 
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to 
operate ought to have noticed it.”150  This definition, however, still 
leaves ambiguity for individual courts to decide what exactly 
constitutes conspicuousness in a particular situation.151  In order to be 
safe, online retailers ought to have the hyperlinks to agreements 
containing disclaimers of warranty (regardless of a hyperlink’s 
placement on a retailer’s webpage), and not just the disclaimers found 
within the terms of the agreements, underlined and in blue capital 
letters to indicate the presence of a hyperlink.152 
 
 
 147  See generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 148  See Sura & DeRise, supra note 60. 
 149  Section 2-316 of the U.C.C. provides that in order for a retailer to disclaim any 
implied warranties for the goods sold under a given contract, such a disclaimer must 
be “conspicuous.”  These browse-wrap agreements may contain disclaimers but even if 
they do not, being conspicuous would be a good protective measure that online 
retailers can take in order to make sure that under the FAA, as well as the U.C.C., 
courts will enforce their browse-wrap agreements’ terms.  See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2015); see 
also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 5.  
 150  U.C.C. §1-201(b)(10). 
 151  Id.  
 152  See Gemma Fitzsimmons et al., On Measuring the Impact of Hyperlinks on Reading, 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON (2013), http://www.gemmafitzsimmons.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/On_Measuring_the_Impact_of_Hyperlinks_on_Reading
2013.pdf (“Displaying hyperlinks in blue has become part of the online culture and 
most people would [recognize] a blue word on a Web page as a hyperlink.”).  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit in Specht found that because no reasonable 
user of Netscape’s website would scroll past an enticing “Download” 
button to find the hyperlink containing Netscape’s browse-wrap 
agreement, the online downloader lacked constructive knowledge of 
the agreement’s terms.  As a result, the Second Circuit did not enforce 
the browse-wrap agreement, including its arbitration provision.  With 
both actual and constructive knowledge lacking, the court held that 
the parties did not assent to the terms.  Notwithstanding the FAA and 
its strong support by the Supreme Court, arbitration provisions cannot 
be enforced without such assent. 
Psychological studies regarding the predominance of impulse 
buys by online shoppers in recent years and new technological 
advances that further encourage impulse buys support the conclusion 
that the Specht court’s decision should be applied to all online retailer 
browse-wrap agreement cases.  Due to the analogous nature between 
an individual enticed to click a “Download” button in Specht and an 
online shopper’s impulse to click on a desired item to make a purchase 
without scrolling any further down a webpage, states should adopt the 
reasoning in Specht for all online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.  
To prevent courts from finding a retailer’s browse-wrap agreement 
unenforceable due to a lack of constructive knowledge, this Comment 
recommends that online retailers either place the hyperlink 
containing the browse-wrap agreement at the top of their webpages or 
above their “Complete Purchase” buttons. 
Although this Comment makes suggestions for state legislatures 
and/or the highest courts of the states to adopt when dealing with 
constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, the 
recommendations of this Comment are intended to apply only to 
online retailers.155  The suggestions in this Comment, however, are not 
limited to only online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements containing 
arbitration provisions.  Arbitration provisions, however, have become 
increasingly popular, and most disagreements regarding browse-wrap 
agreements revolve around one party wishing to find an arbitration 
provision within the agreement unenforceable.156  As a result of the 
 
155 Major reasons why this Comment focuses on online retailing websites are: (1) 
because these websites are the most analogous to Specht; and (2) online shopping has 
increased drastically over the past decade, contributing to the necessity of uniformity 
in court decisions regarding the enforceability of these online agreements.  See Banjo 
& Fitzgerald, supra note 1. 
156 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); Hines v. 
Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 893 F. 
Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012). 
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increased need for guidance in this area of law, this Comment focuses 
on browse-wrap agreements containing arbitration agreements in 
particular, but its analysis applies equally to online retailers’ browse-
wrap agreements without such provisions.  If states adopt the 
suggestions of this Comment when dealing with online retailers’ 
browse-wrap agreements, decisions within given jurisdictions will yield 
consistent, uniform results. 
 
